Three arguments for the conclusion that objects cannot endure in B-time even if they remain intrinsically unchanged are examined: Carter and Hestevold's enduring-objects-as-universals argument (1994) and Barker and Dowe's Paradox 1 and Paradox 2 (2003; 2005) . All three are shown to fail.
Introduction
Discussions of endurance in B-time (the kind of time posited in the B-theory of time) have tended to focus on the problem of temporary intrinsics, i.e. the question whether objects can endure through intrinsic change. 1 However, that question is arguably subordinate to the question whether an object can endure in B-time without intrinsically changing. If objects cannot even endure in B-time without intrinsic change, discussion of temporary intrinsics is surely idle. Carter and Hestevold (1994) and Barker and Dowe (2003; 2005) have addressed the more fundamental question. They argue that objects cannot endure in B-time, irrespective of intrinsic change. In this paper, I shall take a close look at these arguments and see if they stand up to scrutiny. I shall argue they do not.
The enduring-objects-as-universals argument
The first argument goes like this. 2 In the B-theory of time, all times -times which, from our current location in time, appear to be either past, present or future -and their contents, are ontologically on a par and interrelated by the B-relations earlier than, later than and simultaneous with. (So-called A-properties, such as being past, present, and future, are rejected.) 3 Since all times and their contents are equally real, if an object O (e.g. a stone, tree, car or person) persists through time by enduring, i.e. by being wholly present at distinct times as numerically the same entity, O will have to be multiply located in time. In other words, O will have to be wholly present earlier and later than itself. But an object -a concrete particular -can only be repeated in this way, the argument goes, on pain of becoming a universal! A concrete particular can persist through B-time only by either perduring (i.e.
being a four-dimensional entity with distinct temporal parts at distinct times) or exduring (i.e.
being a three-dimensional entity with distinct temporal counterparts at distinct times). 4 This is a weak argument. Why would an object, multiply located in B-time, have to be a universal? Universals -in the Aristotelian/Armstrongian tradition (e.g. Armstrong, 1989) , which, unlike the Platonic tradition, allows them to be spatiotemporally located -are characteristically entities which are repeatable in time and in space (at a single time).
However, an object enduring in a normal manner in B-time is multiply located only in time,
not space (at a single time). Hence, by simply enduring in B-time such an object is quite far from behaving like a classical immanent universal.
An advocate of the argument may retort that proponents of endurance in B-time who endorse the possibility of backward time travel (e.g. Miller, 2006) are committed to the notion that objects are, or at least can be, wholly present at distinct places at a single time, apart from being wholly present at distinct times: if an enduring object 'doubles back' in Btime to an earlier time where it is already located, it will be multiply located in space at the relevant time; and such an object would be universal-like indeed! However, even the B-theorist endurantists who regard time travel as a genuine possibility 5 (as many emphatically do not: e.g. Mellor 1998, Ch. 12) can almost certainly resist the imputation that objects, on their view of time and persistence, turn out to be universals. 6 For even if they are committed to the idea that both objects and universals are repeatables in space-time, they can still point to major differences between the two categories of being, and hence maintain that being a repeatable is not sufficient for being a universal.
To begin with, they can point out that for an object to be multiply located in space at a single time, that object has to enter a time machine, or a wormhole in space-time, obliged to concede that putative objects in fact are "universals in drag" (Carter and Hestevold, 1994, p. 279) . 
The argument from Paradox 1
Barker and Dowe (2003) do not press the enduring-objects-as-universals argument into service. Instead they argue that if objects (and, equally, immanent universals) were to endure in B-time they would be both three-dimensional and four-dimensional. Since no entity can be like this, endurance in B-time is impossible. (They consequently hold that not even universals can endure in B-time. Their argument therefore has wider scope than the enduring-objects-asuniversals argument.)
Barker and Dowe reason as follows:
Take a multi-located entity O, be it enduring entity or universal. Say that O is multi-located throughout a 4D space-time region R. Thus there is a division of R into sub-regions r, such that O is wholly located at each r.
[…] At each r that is a sub-region of R, there is an entity -a universal, or enduring entity -of a certain 7 I should mention that Carter and Hestevold (1994, pp. 278-279) back up their allegation by comparing endurance in B-time with 'endurance' over possible worlds, assuming Modal Parity (i.e. the thesis that all possible worlds are ontologically on a par). They hold that only universals can be multiply located in different worlds given Modal Parity. They subsequently ask: why should the situation be any different for times given Temporal Parity (i.e. the thesis that all times are ontologically on a par)? It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the modal case. However, I have two things to say about this analogy. First, Carter and Hestevold have not shown that only universals can be multiply located in different worlds given Modal Parity -they merely intuit that it is so. Secondly, the temporal case differs from the modal one in that times belong to a single, unified world: the contents of distinct times -in contrast with the contents of distinct possible worlds -are interrelated by earlier-/later-than relations and causal/nomological relations. Hence, the cases are significantly different. (ii) F(O r ) has parts at every sub-region of R. So it has non-zero spatial and temporal extent. F(O r ) is a 4D entity. Conclusion: F(O r ) is both 3D and 4D, but that is a contradiction since being 3D means having no temporal extent, and being 4D means having temporal extent. (Barker and Dowe, 2003, p. 107) This argument is flawed. If O is an enduring entity, it is 3D in the sense that it is extended in three spatial dimensions 8 but not extended in the temporal dimension. 9 In other words, it is 3D in the sense that it has spatial proper parts (at times) but no temporal proper parts -it is wholly present at each of the distinct times (instants) (2005), where they respond to criticisms of their original paper, they write, after presenting an argument that is essentially the same as the one given above (but uses the example of Eric the enduring cat):
8 That is, if it is extended in all spatial dimensions (neglecting the curled dimensions of string theory); otherwise it is 2D or less. I suppose an immanent universal would not have to be 3D. 9 Here I disagree with Bebee and Rush (2003, p. 313) , who claim: "No sensible endurantist is going to equate being a 3D object and having zero temporal extent." I think sensible endurantists should do just this.
Some people produce the following dismissive response to the first paradox: F(Eric r ) has parts at every sub-region r of the 4-dimensional space R. But F(Eric r ) is not 4-dimensional because these parts are not proper parts -they are all Eric! We reply that there is a single thing at every sub-region r of R. Eric is eternally at r 1 , at r 2 , at r 3 , etc. The region R is filled up! In terms of occupation there is no difference between this situation and that where each occupier of a 4-D space is non-identical to every other occupier. The fact of identity does not affect the matter of occupation and the whole space being occupied. If the space is fully occupied, how can the fusion of the occupiers not be a 4-dimensional object? (2005, p. 70) Answer: the fusion will fail to be 4D if the occupiers of the filled 4D space happen to be, not several, but a single enduring 3D object that is multiply located within the relevant region.
Is this answer tenable? In their original paper, Barker and Dowe use a spatial analogy to show that it is absurd to deny that the fusion of the O r s (Eric r s) is 4D .
Take a spatial analogy. Say a person time travels 10 times, and 10 time travelling individuals appear in the same room. Say they squash together on a bench. Then the bench is a ruler. Its parts are in a one-to-one correspondence, in the relevant sense, to human parts. The fusion of the human parts is an object. That 3D object is one-bench length. But we are told that the ten humans are identical. Their fusion then is simply a human. But a human is not one bench in width. Ergo, there can be no spatially multi-located individual. It seems to us nonsensical to attempt to rebut this argument by claiming that the fusion of individuals is not a benchlong thing. We think the response to the 4D case is in exactly the same boat. There is no relevant difference between the spatial case and the 4D case. 10 If the time-travelling human gains/loses weight and swells/shrinks during his time-travelling, it cannot be said that the fusion/human simply has a width of 0.4 m at the time in question: hence we must say that the fusion/human has distinct weights/widths at distinct places at the time in question (see Miller, 2006) . In this paper, however, we are concerned with objects that do not change intrinsically. WLP: If an entity W and a space-time region R are such that for some division of R into sub-regions r, W has a part p located at each sub-region r, then W is located at R and is a 3 or 4D entity according to the dimension of R itself. (Ibid.)
Notice, however, that if the endurance theory of persistence and the B-theory of time are true (or even if the combination is merely possible), WLP is false. In such a case W is 3D, supposing at any rate that entity W is an object and not a process, although W has a part located at each sub-region r and R is 4D. The principle, then, is question-begging.
If it indeed underpins the argument, the argument presupposes what it seeks to establish: that objects cannot endure in B-time.
The argument from Paradox 2
Paradox 1 is no paradox. What about Barker and Dowe's Paradox 2?
Here is how it is formulated:
Say that O is multi-located throughout a 4D space-time region R. Intimately connected with O and R, there is, we submit, a 4D entity which we call the life of O, or L(O).
[…] Lives are part of common sense ontology; we speak of entities -be they people, animate entities or inanimate -having long, interesting, varied, good, etc. lives. Lives are 4D things; they have beginnings, middles, and ends. L(O) is just like an event occurring at a region R; it is located at R with proper parts located at each sub-region r in R. Assuming doctrines of multi-location, lives are paradoxical entities. Where there is a persisting thing, material object or universal, there is a life L(O). There is a necessary connection between a persisting thing and its life. We should accept the principle, call it Independence, that there are no logically or metaphysically necessary connections between distinct existences. can predate and outlive wholes of which they are parts -temporary parts -is a commonplace: my daughter stacks some building blocks on top of each other, creating a tower, but eventually she tears it down, the blocks being spread out on the floor, still existing but no longer parts of the destroyed tower.
Tempting as this response may be, it is not the one I will defend (but see Beebe and Rush, 2005 , for this kind of response). The temporary parthood relation is most naturally wedded to an ontology of three-dimensional, enduring entities, i.e. an ontology where both the whole and its parts are three-dimensional (see Simons, 1987) ; but in the case at hand, the wholes in question are four-dimensional, perduring entities, and it is generally thought that the mereological apparatus most suitable for fourdimensional entities is the one developed by Leonard and Goodman (1940) . That mereology is 'timeless' in the sense that mereological relations are borne, not relative to times, but simpliciter. Thus it is doubtful that temporary parthood can be sensibly My complaint, rather, is that Barker and Dowe have not established that an enduring object must indeed be a part of its life. (The relation might be nonmereological.) In particular, I will argue that the thesis underlying the claim -i.e. that "there is a necessary connection between a persisting thing and its life" -is simply not credible once it is agreed that a persisting thing/object is a 3D entity and that a life is a 4D entity.
It would generally be accepted persisting, living objects might have had shorter or longer lives than they actually have. Descartes lived to fifty-four but he could have died at three (we think). If persisting objects are three-dimensional and persist by enduring, such modal beliefs appear fairly unproblematic and straightforward: we simply imagine a possible world 12 where the object of our concern fails for some reason to be wholly present at times (times later than a certain time t) at which it is located in the actual world (or vice versa). However, in such a situation the life of the object would have been shorter. If lives are indeed four-dimensional, perduring entities, they have to be understood as four-dimensional aggregates of temporal parts (think of the standard perdurantism found in Lewis, 1983, and Armstrong, 1997, p. 102) .
Aggregates, however, have their parts essentially (see my yyyy); and from this it follows that a 3D object which, counterfactually, led a shorter life would lead a 4D life that is numerically distinct from its actual life, since its counterfactual life would lack some of the temporal parts its actual life has. 13 Hence, since the object in question exists in a possible world in which (with 'its life' being understood rigidly) its life does not, there is no necessary connection between the enduring object and its life. Notice, by the way, that if there were a necessary connection between a persisting thing and its life, then, given the Independence principle, we would have to conclude that the thing and its life are numerically identical (the natural position given perdurantism). To conclude, with Barker and Dowe, that they must be related by a partwhole relation would be a very weak way of expressing their relationship, as proper parts, although not parts, are necessarily distinct from the wholes of which they are parts (although they certainly overlap).
12 I take it that possible worlds can be invoked here even if we do not conceive of them realistically. 13 In my (yyyy) I argue in detail that the 4D aggregate in the non-actual world is not even a counterpart of the actual 4D aggregate, pace van Inwagen (1990).
Conclusion
I conclude that all three arguments against endurance per se in B-time fail: they do not establish what they aim to establish. Although I would concede that endurance per se in B-time is counterintuitive to an extent, I do not think that this widespread intuition is sufficiently strong or reliable to render discussions about endurance through intrinsic change in B-time futile.
